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The Household: Informal Order Around the Hearth  
By Robert C. Ellickson, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010.  272 pp.  ISBN 978-
0691147994 £13.95 paperback 
Reviewed by Simone Wong, Kent Law School, University of Kent 
 
Domestic relationships in a variety of household formations are a topic of great interest to many 
legal academics working in areas as diverse as property law, contract law, family law and trusts law. 
The focus of academic enquiries has been predominantly on the domestic arrangements of spouses 
and latterly, with the rise in cohabitation in western societies,1 cohabiting relationships as well, 
specifically on issues arising when these relationships are terminated, in what Ellickson calls the 
endgame. Recently, some legal academics have begun to expand these intellectual enquiries by, for 
example, questioning the normative conceptualisation of the dwelling place as a home (Fox, 2007). 
What have been less theorised however are the phenomenon of the household as an institution in 
its own right, whether or not the participants are related as a family,2 and the domestic practices of 
household participants during the currency of the relationships, gaps Ellickson seeks to plug in this 
book. A novel aspect of Ellickson's book is his concern over the ways in which household formation 
and governance are shaped during the existence of the household relationship  ? i.e. in what he 
describes as midgame  ? since the preoccupation of much of existing legal scholarship has been with 
the endgame resolution. 
Households are multi-stranded and tend to be more transitory than families, especially where the 
household occupants are socially distant. They comprise multilateral relationships involving three 
                                                          
1 In the UK, for instance, cohabitation rates have been on the rise. Based on the 2001 Census conducted by the 
Office of National Statistics, there are just over 2 million cohabiting couples in the UK, a rise of 67% from the 
numbers in 1991. 
2 Ellickson in fact reminds us that a distinction should be drawn between family and marriage and the 
household, in that entry into and exit from household relationships can be achieved with relative informality,  
and those relationships also tend to be more fragile.  
possible groups: co-occupants, co-owners, and both co-occupants and co-owners. In the book, 
Ellickson explores how and why individuals make the choices they do in forming household 
relationships and in shaping their domestic arrangements. The book comprises nine chapters in 
which Ellickson develops several themes. Firstly, he considers the impact of less recognised variables 
such as legal principles and transaction costs on household formation. Ellickson adopts a liberal 
discourse in the book, with one of his key arguments being that liberal principles of private property 
applied to inputs into household production such as land, capital and labour, freedom of contract 
and freedom of exit provide ambient conditions for the development of a dynamic market in 
household forms. For Ellickson, these three-fold liberal entitlements are crucial to the governance of 
household relationships as they provide participants with the potential to be independent agents. 
For instance, in chapter 2, Ellickson alludes to the way in which freedom of exit is a particularly 
useful entitlement: the threat of exit empowers household occupants to negotiate the terms of their 
occupancy. Other developments such as women's increased work opportunities and laws providing 
for easier exit from the household relationship, e.g. no-fault divorce and the more straightforward 
partitioning or sale of property, place household occupants in a better position to negotiate a 
greater allocation of household surplus (p. 26). Moreover, the acknowledgement of the rule of law in 
a liberal society further facilitates contract formation between household occupants and outsiders, 
thereby reducing the need for larger household membership in order to produce sufficient outputs 
ƚŽŵĞĞƚƚŚĞŚŽƵƐĞŚŽůĚ ?ƐĐŽŶƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶŶĞĞĚƐ ?
The second theme is, relatedly, the strong influence of transaction costs on the coordination of 
households. Ellickson argues in chapter 3 that transaction costs motivate people to form households 
with a small number of intimates in preference to strangers due to the higher levels of trust and 
homogeneity in interests among intimates. This engenders greater cooperation between household 
participants which in turn reduces the costs of decision making and monitoring the household. Given 
the trust in relationships between intimates, he asserts that household coordination between 
intimate householders is predominantly based on a process of gift exchange3 which is less costly and 
more satisfying than formal contracting. Ellickson further argues in chapter 6 that transaction costs 
also cause household members to prefer conferring ownership on those occupants who contribute 
the at-risk capital for the acquisition of the property.  As capital providers are most vulnerable to 
exploitation, Ellickson submits that the conferral of ownership is effective compensation to owner-
occupants for undertaking that risk. Ownership gives rise to two further intra-household 
relationships: between co-owners and between co-owners and co-occupants. Drawing on the theory 
of the firm, Ellickson demonstrates how transaction costs influence the way in which the household 
ĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞŝƐƚŚĞŶĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞĚďǇďŽƚŚŐƌŽƵƉƐ ?ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌŝŶƚƌĂ- as well as inter-relationships.  
There are clearly certain advantages to renting rather than owning the dwelling unit. These include 
greater ease with which to exit the household relationship and greater residential mobility. 
Nonetheless, Ellickson asserts that transaction cost considerations can influence co-occupants to 
become co-owners in order to, for instance, pool capital in the acquisition of the property and/or 
spread the risks of adverse circumstances like illness, injury and unemployment. External legal 
measures such as regulatory, welfare or fiscal measures can also affect the dynamics of household 
formation. Rent control, for example, may affect people's choices of where and with whom to set up 
a household. To further demonstrate the effect of transaction costs on the optimality of household 
co-occupancy, Ellickson from time to time draws comparisons between conventional intimate 
households and larger household communities such as secular (e.g. condominiums and co-housing) 
and religion-based (e.g. Benedictines and Hutterian Brethen) intentional communities. He illustrates 
how the complexities of governing larger households and the issue of transaction costs have led to 
most such communities, aside from the religion-based intentional communities, keeping their 
household membership low, i.e. to no more than two to three dozen.  
                                                          
3 Ellickson distinguishes between gift exchange and altruistic giving, with the former based on the reciprocal 
spontaneous exchange of services. 
A third theme the book considers is the ways in which the study of the household helps to shed light 
on the extent to which small-bore private law4 affects household coordination. This theme is 
developed most comprehensively by Ellickson in chapter 8 where he asserts that most people tend 
to avoid or minimise the involvement of formal legal processes. He states that the preference is to 
organise household arrangements informally and beyond the shadow of private law. This is 
particularly the case with intimate households where formalisation is not only more costly and time-
consuming but also antithetical to the nature of trust in a relationship between intimates. 
Household participants tend to favour a form of governance that will enhance their sharing of 
household surpluses. In so doing, householders generally prefer to adopt a decentralised and 
informal method of governance. In the case of intimate householders, they are more likely to opt for 
a consensus approach, rather than a majority vote or unanimity, to decision making (p. 98) and low-
level household rules, both substantive and procedural, to govern the household relationship. In 
such households, these low-level rules tend to arise from 'second-party rules', i.e. rules that are 
generated by the household participants through their practices over time, contracts (usually 
informal) made among themselves and also rules formulated by organisations that they establish (p. 
101). Crucially, Ellickson asserts that these low-level household rules are based on relationship-
specific norms which arise from the reciprocal acts of cooperation between participants and against 
a backdrop of gift exchange, a process of low-level coordination (p. 103).  
In addition to low-level household rules, Ellickson points to two other potential sources of rules that 
may also influence the household governance structure: ambient social norms and legal rules. 
Ellickson, however, takes the view that legal rules are more likely to have relevance in endgame 
disputes rather than in the midgame relationship. The uptake of legal rules is generally low by 
household participants in midgame since the spirit of 'give-and-take' is still strong among 
participants: transaction costs are lower when midgame issues are resolved informally. Alternatively, 
                                                          
4 Ellickson describes small-bore legal rules as those the scope and effect of which are insufficient to qualify as 
being 'foundational' rules of a liberal society like the three core liberal principles of private property, freedom 
of contract and freedom of exit: see p. 50. 
Ellickson argues that a household participant may threaten to exercise his or her right of exit to 
discipline other participants and/or to ensure a sufficient flow of household surplus in his or her 
direction. Ambient norms, concedes Ellickson, can strongly influence the governance structure of the 
household in so far as these are internalised by participants. For instance, a strong adherence to 
gender norms concerning the allocation of household responsibilities may disproportionately 
disadvantage women in terms of allocation of household tasks which may in turn impair their share 
of the household surplus.  
While Ellickson acknowledges the problem, he seems somewhat overly optimistic about the ability 
of a liberal discourse to resolve the matter. The same may be said of Ellickson's response to the 
possible problem of exploitation of a vulnerable participant by the other members of a household.5 
In these situations, Ellickson places great faith in the ability of a household participant to discipline 
or control the others through threatening to exercise, or indeed exercising, his or her liberal 
freedom of exit. Ellickson is mindful of criticisms levelled at liberalism by feminist and non-feminist 
commentators. For instance, in chapter 2, he notes the concerns raised by Milton Regan (1999) 
about the use of liberal discourse in relation to intimate relationships. In chapter 5, he likewise 
acknowledges the concerns of feminist commentators about the limitations of self-determination 
and of individuals as autonomous decision-makers. These concerns, however, are dealt with 
somewhat cursorily in the book, with Ellickson coming down in favour of the ability of liberal 
principles  ? particularly, the freedom of exit as a disciplining tool  ? to manage. It is difficult to be 
fully persuaded by liberal arguments though when these are weighed against the countervailing 
evidence of economic inequalities within intimate household relationships which may be caused by 
factors such as adherence to gender norms in determining the allocation of household 
responsibilities. This can in turn affect matters such as power and control over decision-making and 
lead to the disempowering of vulnerable household participants from exercising the core liberal 
entitlement of exit (see e.g. Pahl, 1989; Tichenor, 1999; Vogler, 1998 & 2005; Powell & Van Vugt, 
                                                          
5 See chapter 2 of the book. 
2003; Kenney, 2006). A liberal discourse may do no more than offer formal equality rather than 
equity to those who are indeed vulnerable parties within the household. 
Notwithstanding the reservations that one might have about Ellickson's liberal arguments, this book 
is a welcome addition to the literature. It covers an area which has to date attracted limited 
academic critique but one which certainly merits closer academic study. It provides academics and 
students with a keen analysis of the wider phenomenon of home-sharing, with an interesting, albeit 
liberal, perspective on the household. Most importantly, this book raises academic consciousness of 
the significance of and need for greater interrogation of the household as a legal phenomenon.  
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